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Publications

16 April, 2008; 20:30:22

Juschenko, Timoschenko and two goldfish

Much more attention has recently been devoted to our Eastern neighbours: Ukraine and Russia by the Financial Times. Even Polish newspapers tackle the subject less frequently. The main issues described in the FT are natural resources, political changes in Russia and Bucharest NATO Summit outcomes. It may just as well be some form of letting off steam. The battle is finished and yet it is difficult to forget what the European-Russian dialogue looked like in the recent weeks. Head of the FT foreign section timidly admits that Russia’s verbal attacks have this time outdone everything we’ve known from contemporary history.

Let us, however, go back to Ukraine. It will most probably come before Russia in the race towards the World Trade Organisation (WTO). According to the Ukrainian government members, the country intends to use this fact to its own advantage in order to exert pressure upon Russia. Russia makes little of it so far, having been used to the fact that no criteria, apart from great politics, various forms of extortion, threats or stories about emergency in Russia, can in long term be decisive when it comes to Russia. There will always be someone in Europe who will, to Russia’s and Europe’s misfortune, recite all these incantations. It also rarely happens that anyone negotiating with Russia would go back to some basic questions, such as those of OECD negotiations: whether Russia meets economic criteria, political criteria, etc.

Let us therefore use our imagination: slightly invigorated Ukraine, using its various forms of advantage, starts attacking Russia in front of multinational audience. After all, it doesn’t intend to afford persistent antilobbying taking place in some European capital cities. Is Ukraine right? Well, most probably it is. But is it the most important issue for Ukraine at present? It is true that there are reasons to be somehow enthusiastic. It turned out at a key moment of the Summit that Ukraine is not forlorn, that it may count on Poland’s support and that both Poland and other countries managed to raise some more understanding for the Ukrainian rights. Reactions in Kiev were positive and optimistic; Juschenko presented Summit outcomes as successful and leading on the right track towards NATO membership. Still, it is interesting if social support for Ukraine entering NATO will increase. But the arguments upon Dnieper River have not died away. Quarrels over economy department, clashes between government and president have not ceased. I repeatedly wrote and argued that the Ukrainian political scene conflicts do not go beyond the standard prevailing in democratic countries where the citizens are more firm. It is hard to say whether anyone in Kiev needs our advice but I think it is time to put out Ukrainian disputes a bit as the country has too much to lose. Our Eastern neighbour is going to face a real race against time this year, the race whose stake is the reputation and future of a truly independent country. Let us not make things up, things are just as they were desired by the significant, pro-European part of the politcal stage, as well as public opinion aware of the fact of what NATO really is. Incidentally, the support for Poland’s joining NATO in 1992 wasn’t so strong either.

NATO is not yet as close as optimists in Kiev and pessimists in Moscow claim, but Ukraine, being a NATO candidate, will definitely be observed from now on. Are ”orange authorities” capable of doing anything to, at least, oppose the anti-NATO propaganda in the Russian TV stations? Is there any chance for organising public opinion awareness campaign, like the Georgians did? Can NATO-entering-issue be the beginning of the Ukrainian internal political debate where part of the stake will be convincing some members of the Party of Regions? The latter refers both to Ukraine and Poland. Euro 2012. The inhabitants of this part of Europe got used to thinking: “things will work out”; no matter what, we’ll pull ourselves together and be able to build yet another Wawel castle. Unfortunately, this rule does not apply to building stadiums or airports. If the designing works or construction works (on those sites where construction works will already have started) are the same at the end of this year as they are now, the only thing to do will be staking on whether the failure in 2012 will be partial or complete. After Euro 2008 everybody will be observing us and political assurances will be for nothing. There is another question to this matter: can Ukraine and Poland, with their post-communist societies, use European football championships to initiate something more than mere awaiting match results? Can they initiate a powerful, public movement, collective campaigns and brotherhood? Unfortunately, Polish and Ukrainian politicians very rarely pay attention to Euro preparations.

I would therefore like to, after one Russian proverb, wish Ukraine covering larger distance without publicity. NATO and Euro are like two goldfish. With certain amount of help, they may conjure up a lot for Ukraine. There will still be time for the “Slavic” getting even with the neighbours later on. Meanwhile, let Chancellor Merkel in Strasbourg and Financial Times commentators tell the truth straight into Russian and European faces.

A pact in favour of Poland’s position

The biggest problem of Poland nowadays is not really the fact that the minister would like to shatter the accomplishment of generations of Polish thinkers and politicians at one go and turn us a thousand years back into the past. The postulate of forgetting about our Eastern neighbours was one of the People’s Republic of Poland characteristic features. Gomułka and Jaruzelski were constantly talking about the Piast ideas although, in their relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, they were rather referring to the wars fought after the year 1002. In this revived Piast sentiment one can also notice certain references to (with all respect) some National Democracy political traditions, such as taking cognizance of Russia’s key role in the region.

Resigning from the Jagiellon ULB (Ukraine Lithuania Belarus) policy at present means condemning Poland to the years-long role of a provincial country pressed to the Union’s border without a possibility to act.

The key to Polish foreign relations, apart from international balance of power which is worsening from month to month, can also be found in Poland itself. Revitialising our position in international relations, especially in the Central Europe, requires some kind of great agreement (I am afraid of using the term “coalition”) in Polish politics which would last for a couple of years; it requires some new, practical “pact in favour of Poland’s position in Europe”. Is there still a possibility of reaching the agreement which would lead to urgent army reform, secret service reinforcement, and improvement of infrastructure, roads and airports? Can we agree on the shape of our energy safety or are we eternally doomed to the grand lobbing game of multinational concerns? The same question asked in the historical -costume-context would go as follows: is that the end of Poniatowski’s epoch or are the Saxons still in power?

Poland had no move before 1989. After gaining independence we acquired some operating perspectives. There are too few of them to be picky. Today’s realism is the ability to seize an opportunity arising after USSR disintegration instead of having our hand in restoration of the USSR sphere of influence.

Author of the article is a member of the European Parliament, the head of the EU-Ukraine delegation, the former Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Vice-President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Polish Parliament’s Lower Chamber (Sejm).

Rzeczpospolita, 3 October, 2009

 

Georgia’s dress rehearsal

Paweł Kowal’s blog; 19 April, 2008

It is perhaps the eleventh-hour call to reflect on the EU, NATO-Russia relations. Maybe we are actually the witnesses of a dress rehearsal revealing whether the separatist republics situated on the former USSR territory will act like “love embrace” clips with Russia, or turn out to be a matter of a distant future. Meanwhile, some Polish politicians and commentators are wondering whether Polish President is eligible to issue statements or make appointments with other heads of state without the agency of Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department Director! Is there anyone in Poland not supporting our position on Georgia’s territorial integrity? Does it annoy anyone in here? Even the best scheme in politics can be ruined by events which thwart our carefully prepared plans, upon which we nevertheless have no influence... Russia doesn’t like our stance, there’s no doubt about that.

The Bucharest Summit will remain an unhealed wound for a certain amount of time. On closing the meeting, everybody went back to their own countries just the way it’s usually being done after this sort of events: with perky faces and the leaders taking care of presenting Summit outcomes as a compromise which was acceptable for everyone. The reality is, however, that it was only the allies who could boast themselves about the success at the meeting. Those were the allies who aimed at acceptance of the declaration stating that the way of obtaining MAP (Membership Action Plan) is yet open. The USA, on the other hand, could not brag about victory at all. It was probably for the first time in the last dozen years or so of NATO history that their persuasion gained no support. Taking the US position and expectations into account, the outcome was just insufficient. Russia’s attack on the Summit participants was unprecedented. It resulted in certain question marks. When such form of pressure is put in secluded cabinets, it undermines the authority of the European leaders to a smaller extent. Here, however, everything took place with a pulled up curtain and became problematic in numerous respects. Immediately after Sunday, at the European Council of Europe meeting in Strassbourg, the question of human rights observation was raised by the Federal Chancellor. The issue wasn’t picked up on the continent and, in the context of the situation from before the Bucharest Summit, it came out rather wanly.

Meanwhile, Russia did not let anyone wait too long for its response to the Bucharest Summit outcomes. One of the commentators, Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, pointed out, after the Summit was over, that Russia will use additional time resulting from MAP-granting delay for obstructing actions and that it will treat it as some kind of last resort. He was probably right about it. And so the subject which by no means should constitute a surprise for anybody, has returned. Territorial integrity, the threat it carries over and Russian guarantees: this was the idea which appeared in the disintegrating Soviet empire several years ago; for the republics leaving the Soviets it was functioning as a kind of fastener with their former headquarters. I wonder who came up with the idea of a mechanism resembling certain kind of protection against the recent subjects entering NATO, United Europe or any other free-world-institutions. Before the Bucharest Summit politicians in Moscow were clearly signaling their intention to use Abkhazia and South Ossetia tensions as a handbrake on their anticipated road towards sovereign countries. It is impossible, for the lack of space here, to present the whole tradition of Russia’s interfering in the lives of certain nations by creating or enforcing local ethnic, religious and territorial conflicts. The example of a place where the so called “frozen conflicts” play a significant role is the Caucasus, e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh is the main reason why, the Azerbaijanis have no chance to come to terms with the Armenians. It is also the reason why Armenia has to persist in the love embrace with Russia for good and bad. Moldova, on the other hand, is tied with Russia by the Transnistria conflict, etc. Even Ukraine was, in some bad times, taken into account in the Russian scenario of tying countries to its own self by territorial conflict, although the matter does not sound as dramatically reliable in this case. It also happened alike during the “Orange Revolution” and recent Bucharest talks, where an interesting exchange on Ukraine’s territorial integrity took place between Presidents Bush and Putin. A few days later the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, as befits a skillful diplomat, officially interpreted this statement very much differently from what it had been heard in Bucharest.

Adjara, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were supposed to be the clips connecting Georgia to the former Empire but the plan did not work out for Georgia. Abkhazia was a part of independent Georgia between 1917 and 1921. After Bolsheviks’ entrance, the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed; its status during the Soviet times was very various. What it always did, however, was performing its role of the barometer for Georgian position in the USSR. Abkhazia proclaimed independence in 1992, which was the beginning of the war with Georgia. An agreement was signed two years later; obviously, in Moscow. It broadened the Abkhazian autonomy in Georgia. As a result of this, peacekeeping force of a kind, consisting of Russian soldiers, are stationed in Abkhazia. A very similar story took place in Ossetia. After having occupied Georgia in 1921 the Soviets created the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. In 1989 the separatists backed by Russia proclaimed the union with North Ossetia in Russia.

The question of Georgia’s territorial integrity had already appeared a few times before the Summit. First, it sluggishly emerged during Kosovo conflict where Russia, luckily ineffectually enough, attempted to create analogies between the Balkan situation and the Caucasus countries. Then, just before the Summit, the leading Russian politicians (I am not mentioning the commentators as they overacted much too much) clearly stated on one occasion that the whole of Georgia will not enter NATO and, on another, that problems with self-appointed republics will emerge, and so on. Russia also formally annulled restrictions on economic relations with Abkhazia just before the Bucharest Summit. It was mentioned in the newspapers, not only Polish ones, that the matter will be a problem. Thursday’s edition of The Guardian devoted quite some space to Abkhazia and Ossetia. It was also on Thursday that Putin ordered Russian administration taking a number of steps aiming at actual acknowledgement of the separatists and, surely, at least intensifying tension with Georgia. Sukhumi and Tskhinvali (the two capital cities) and NATO Secretary General perceived it , in the same way (though the former ones with enthusiasm and the latter with anxiety). Only Russia claimed it had meant something different. One might say that, in fact, it is hard to blame President Putin. He merely continues doing what he had promised. Everybody heard him, newspapers wrote about it, agencies quoted what he had said… It is rather those pretending not to have heard it that have a problem. This is why Europe doesn’t know how to react to Russia’s relations with northern Georgia separatists, and, in fact, with the Russian-Georgian problems. Perhaps it’s high time to react and call a spade a spade. The response of Poland was very firm but in fact a little isolated, not counting the Department of State’s declaration. Some great people of this world have most frequently hidden behind international organizations’ statements and are waiting for the progress of events.

From the Russian point of view, the stake is predominantly maintaining permanent destabilization in the Caucasus, which will later evolve into an argument against Georgia’s joining NATO, repeated by democratic countries like mantra. Yet, it was as long ago as last year that Moscow was said to be losing patience for Georgia and planning to use the separatist republics’ case to its own advantage. The clock started ticking viciously. A really serious conflict may actually break out in northern Georgia.

 

Kowal for Rzeczpospolita: We are not saying good-bye to Giedroyc

A true realism is Poland’s active policy in the region, contrary to the expectations that we sit quiet; a true realism is close relations with Ukraine, Lithuania and the Visegrad Group countries.

Paweł Kowal; 3 October, 2009

It was one year ago that Radosław Sikorski referred to Poland’s position in Europe and Polish-German relations of the first Piasts as to the expected model of behaviour. What he probably meant by this was Mieszko I and Bolesław Chrobry relationships with the imperial court before the war outbreak in 1002. Polish-European policy of that time was 100% overlapping with the Polish-German relations which, in turn, were based on various forms of Poland’s dependence on its neighbours. Otton III, who was trying to win Chrobry for the strategoc plans of uniting Europe under his own reign, came to Gniezno and showered the prince with gifts.

Rafał Ziemkiewicz asks (no historical robes this time), whether it is now a good moment for us to become Germany’s satellite. The aim of Sikorski’s reference to the Piast policy model is masking Tusks’s government idleness in the Eastern region after 2007. The reduction of Polish foreign policy, being at the same time its greatest amputation after 1989 is, as it turned out, the continuation of the smiling policy.

The ULB concept

A contradiction to the Piast model of the Polish foreign policy is the Jagiellonian tradition, according to which it is out of the question to put a high wall on the Eastern border of Poland/EU and separate the European living room from the everlasting anteroom. The Jagiellonian model of the 20th century is mainly associated with Piłsudski’s plans; it not only gained Giedroyc’s support but was backed up b the post-1976 oppositionists, such as Macierewicz or Michnik. Also John Paul II supported it. People associated with Culture monthly magazine realised that the present Jagiellonian idea is by no means a fantasy of contemporary romantics but a form of Polish realism. It was assumed that the Poles have to deal with the Vilnius and Lvov’s issues once and for all in order to build positive relations with their Eastern neighbours and form a strong country. No other European nation managed to deal with such huge loss (the loss of eastern parts of the country) with such dignity as the Republic of Poland. And hardly any other idea came at such great cost to Poland. Because the existence of free nations in the East brings an issue of a centuries-long Polish-Russian rivalry over this territory to the close, Mieroszewski was right in assuming that freedon of nations located behind Poland’s eastern border is a guarantee of the country’s normal development and proper relations with Russia. Everything he said is still valid. The ULB concept is actually an exchange of the historical resentiment for the specialty of the Polish political cuisine, i.e. solidarity. After 20 years of policy based on these rules the feeling of bitterness may only accompany those who saw Giedroyc’s ideas as a form of Polish colonialism in the East and for those who are now in despair for not having made a fortune on alliance with Ukraine or Lithuania. Our relations with those countries could be better, but they couldn’t bring about huge gains if the input was so small. Poland struggled with numerous transformation problems. Their essence (luckily) had to be a partnership with our turning a blind eye on potential and possibility differences. Such policy freed us from the Russian shadow and gave an opportunity of manoeuvrs.

The old gentleman from Maisons-Laffitte perfectly realised that once you don’t own cannons or money, it is friendship, even a hard one, that must be respected and appreciated. Someone will say: ”This is too little”. I reply: an alternative to looking for close alliance with Ukraine or Lithuania in 1989 was getting into an argument about everything, starting from history and finishing with minority laws. If we hadn’t chosen East then, would we have gained more? Would out reputation in Europe have grown bigger if we had been hostile or cool towards Ukraine and Lithuania? Wouldn’t have Russia volunteered as intermediary in such conflicts? Rational strategic analyses must not be restricted to the concert of wishes, one has to present analternative or better scenarios for our country. Neither Sikorski nor Ziemkiewicz presented any of those.

An argument in Europe is not about land, nor is it about money, it is all about solidarity. Kremlin is delighted with solidarity lack. The aim of Russian policy in Poland’s case is breaking internal political solidarity in strategic matters. Russians have been trying to destroy it for years. Poles were imprudently helping them to do that. Stefan Niesiołowski’s opinion on the character of Katyn massacre wins in the ”worst damage” category of the year.

Secondly, Russians are all about destroying our solidarity with the neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe; it is their peculiar offer of leaving us alone in return for being quiet on the regional issues, thaht is Russian policy towards Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, etc. Yet, Polish government made mistakes in this sphere as well. Our neighbours will definitely keep in mind leaving Lithuania alone with its veto against the Union-Russia agreement.

Because we are not a Jagiellonian superpower and we are just expected to be a subtle Central-European go-between, trust and partnership are matters of great importance in our international relations. The rule especially applies to Poland because its potential exceeds some other regional partners in this part of the continent. Thirdly, Russia wants to destroy our solidarity of the EU countries. It has permanently violated it, like by means of Nord Stream project or Polish meat importing-ban.

Also in this respect have the Polish politicians, hungry for a quick succes in Polish–Russian relations, thoughtlessly put their two penn’orth in: one of the first Donald Tusk’s decisions was changing the formula of talks on the Russian embargo for Polish meat. The rule established by Jarosław Kaczyński, saying that it is the Union who talks to Russia on the matter, and Poland being only a concerned observer, has been changed for Polish-Russian talks with having the Union as an observer. A clear signal was sent: why use the Union if it is most effective to talk directly to Russia in the East?

It’s a fact: Poland’s position has been weakened in the last two years. I am afraid that referring to Piasts may be the result of some calculations after Union’s failures in the East. Weakness of the Union is especially clearly visible from the ministerial cabinets. Nevertheless, Kremlin leaders’ success in ruining the EU solidarity must not present an alibi for the Polish foreign policy changes. One mustn’t announce a new doctrine only for the reason of not having their own political, governmental success either.

A real realism is Poland’s active policy in the region, contrary to the expectation that we sit quiet. A true realism is close relations with Ukraine, Lithuania and the Visegrad Group countries. The relation should be supplemented by South Caucasus and Baltic countries as well as certain Central Asia countries (predominantly Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) cooperating on strategic projects. The core of this cooperation should be energy projects, EU and NATO enlargement issues and, after some time, persuasing Russia that such alliance does not have to strike at its interests.

The 2007 Krakow Summit was prepared along with such scheme. This “Krakow axis” of a kind constitutes a contemporary interpretation of the Jagiellonian tradition or, if you prefer, the Culture heritage. Based on the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian alliance, it could one day become very well functioning creation with a few coordination centres and with very clearly stated common interests and numerous connections. This alternative gives us a permanent chance to avoid being a peripheral country and keeping international position appropriate for our potential.

 

Newsweek No 10/2008 (1315)

The idea that I we should ”get” something from America in order to check the effectiveness of our alliance is a myth.

Alliance with America may be perceived as a strategic Polish foreign policy project with yet many perspectives ahead. This is what meetings of President Kaczyński and George W. Bush in Washington (2006) and Jurata (2007) proved. Having observed Donald Tusk’s preparations to his US visit, one may face the following question: can Polish policy, diplomacy and the new government handle such task?

Inherent assymetry
The most efective alliance Poland has ever made in its contemporary history is the alliance with the USA. Why do some politicians question this fact openly then? Is it because of their tiredness with election campain or because they have this idea to undermine the alliance’s importance in front of pubic opinion? Or perhaps it is a willingness to get hold of a better European ID?
Alliances between big-small, rich-poor, safe-unsafe countries have always been accompanied by difficulties. What careful diplomacy calls ”assymetry” is an inherent feature of the Polish-American alliance in many respects. Still, this particular alliance is the most effective one in the contemporary history of Poland ever. Obviously, there are people who still remember the unfortunate (for Poland) ending of the World War 2; people who remember ineffectiveness of American presidents Roosevelt and Truman in their claims towards Stalin. What is characteristic, the same argument had also been used by the communist propaganda to justify Polish participation in the Soviet system and to obscure the truth about Polish relations with the USA. It was in the whole America, not only in Greenpoint or Milwaukee Street, that millions of Poles found their second homes. America talked about Katyn when the rest of the world was silent about the issue. The US presidents celebrated successive anniversaries of the Warsaw Uprising when it was forbidden in Poland. The United Stetes were supporting Polish freedom movements, especially the ”Solidarity” movement. Ronald Reagan’s tears after having watched ”Man of Iron” were historic.

Abortive ”NATO-bis” concept
One of the conditions under which George Bush’s visited Poland in September 1987 was that he would freely appear on Polish state TV. This visit, together with the earlier Pope John Paul’s pilgrimage, was one of the sparks lghting the freedom fire. The USA eagerly supported transformations upon the Vistula River in 1989 and backed up Polish debts annullment as well as entering NATO and EU. The government under Jan Olszewski was the first one leaving no doubt as to what the choice of free Poles would be. Euro-Atlantic orientation was still questioned for being too radical at that time. It is worthwhile to remind ourselves a misfortunate ”NATO-bis” concept. American allies could count on Polish support for the wars in Kuwait, Iraq and Afganistan. The majority of Polish society supports and supported such policy, even in spite of President Chirac’s reprimands.

It is a myth that we should ”get” something from America in order to check the effectiveness of our alliance.

A key to good relations is proper placement of accents and appropriate definition of goals. The most crucial element in our relations with America is far-reaching enforcement of Poland’s safety instead of concentrating on immediate benefits, though benefits should have their go too. Meanwhile, another myth has been created. It says we should quickly obtain some gains within the alliance to check its effectiveness. Poland is in possession of something absolutely precious, its own reputation. No other country is as much as Poland associated with the words ”freedom”, ”solidarity” and ”loyalty” in the context of alliances. If we exchanged ”freedom” with ”dollars” and ”friendship” with ”interests” we gain very little but we lose our credibility.

Obviously, one may not assume that our relations with the USA should not undergo critical analysis. The problem of visas for the Poles is gaining symbolic importance and should already have been solved. We are often repelled by the USA’s paternalistic attitude which in the recent years has been manifested in persuading us what our relations with neighbours should look like in order not to get tangled into contemporary and historical context. Also supporting our south-eastern and energy policies should have gone further. ”You are talking about previous governments’ submissiveness and ”on your knees” policy. And what does your attitude to the USA look like? Isn’t this submissiveness? And to Iraq? What about the shield? These matters are not settled. This is the result of the incompetent policy of Jarosław Kaczyński”, Donald Tusk stated in the TV debate in October 2007. New government policy on the subject is a serious problem. The shield issue didn’t unfortunately undergo consultation in the Parliament. Stage of the talks can only be assessed on the basis of press articles and politicians’ comments. All those voices sound like an orchestra with all its instruments playing out of tune. Bogdan Klich says something different from Radosław Sikorski. It was only during one last week that we heard Poland made up its mind and the opposite. Government criticizes its predecessors’ negotiating strategy on the one hand but left Witold Wasycyzkowski on the main negotiator’s position. Let’s just hope that Tusk’s visit to the States will allow tuning the instruments and playing successfully, for Poland’s own good sake.
There is yet another interpretation of the current events. The orchestra may be playing incoherently not for negotiating purposes but in order to announce great foreign policy success of this governmen as soon as negotiations finish more or less properly. Meanwhile, solemn countries perceive continuation on foreign policy as a reason to be proud, not ashamed of. Perhaps Tusks wants to ”deal with” the matter in person with Bush and announce it later. Unfortunately, there is also a chance that the matter is all about prolonging negotiations until, for some reason, they become purposeless. It is unclear if we will ever get to know about the purpose of preparing and leading the approaching final talks in such a way.

The opposition might be accused of jinxing (there are people for whom this is the only scheme of thinking about politics) so that the present government would fail. It might be, if it only weren’t for the fact it’s hard to separate the shield issue from the Polish-American relationship context. This relationship is one of the foundations of Polish foreign policy, Polish position in the EU and in the world. It’s worth remembering that.

Angela Merkel’s difficult choice

The first working dinner of Bucharest NATO Summit is over. It seems the decision of granting MAP (Membership Action Plan) to Georgia and Ukraine depends merely on Germany now. Polish activity was effective, the movement of MAP support for those two countries can no longer be ignored. Poland’s appeals to NATO leaders, Saakashvili’s and Juschenko’s visits to Warsaw, public speeches made by the Polish president, prime minister and opposition, such as Lech Kaczyński’s article in Monday’s Financial Times. Warsaw-Washington-Kiev-Tibilisi consultations were very intense and definitely influenced the present structure of positions within NATO as well as the course of Bush’s visit to Ukraine. Apart from numerous comments made by politicians and experts, also the French scientists took the floor by writing ”Don’t be afraid of Putin” to Merkel and Sarkozy. Incidentally, Polish intellectualists are silent on the matter.

If an alien who has only just landed on planet Earth did some European press reading, he would imagine Russia decides on every NATO issue; he would feel that it is habitual to ask Russian permission on everything and to respect its view. He would imagine that the protocole and etiquette in NATO-Russia relations work one-way. It is interesting how he’d interpret that. He would also have an impression that Earth has not yet worked out the partnership principles for international relations. One shudders to think how much has been done by Russia in the recent weeks in order to imply lack of acceptance for NATO enlargement. Russia has put NATO countries (often being EU members at the same time) in an extremely uncomfortable position. Even Russia’s Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs,Grigory Karasin, normally of moderate views, warns of deep crisis in relations with Russia, not to mention strategic lectures by Rogozin (Russian ambassador to NATO) and sharp utterances by Boris Gryzlov (Duma leader). I wonder when the Russians will finally understand how much this situation does harm to their country. It’s hard to believe that the Russians have to such an extent resigned from keeping up diplomatic appearances. It’s also hard to imagine that, after 11 years of close NATO-Russia relations, Russia still predominantly describes the Alliance as it used to describeit in Khruschev and Brezhnev times.

Meanwhile, a question arises: how will the Russians present W. Putin’s participation during Bucharest Summit? The event is precedential. Most probably, no inhibition will appear in the Russian internal propaganda. Russian ambassador to NATO played tough. He criticised the hosts’ programme without ceremony because the Russians endeavoured after the possibility of public speech for Putin. It’s easy to guess that the reason behind the refusal was ordinary fear of what the Russian president might say, not really protocolar reasons. If the ”Rogozin line” appeared at some point of the speech, the risk was that NATO leaders would either be condemned to public retort or to pretending the remarks weren’t directed at them.

Anyone even slightly involved in foreign affairs knows the map of Russian interests in Europe, especially energy-related ones. The map unfortunately overlaps with NATO members opinions on the organisation future to a large extent. It’s a problem o NATO’s prestige and relations with Russia in the future. More and more observers wonder what the outcomes of specific ”total misunderstanding” will be in NATO-Russia relations and whether Russia-EU relations are quickly heading towards the same direction.

Let us get back to Germany. The whole matter becomes difficult for the federal Chancellor for many reasons. Firstly, Germany has been politically and economically active in Ukraine for the last few years. The situation looks very similar for Georgia, where additional positive historic relations prevail. In this case, it can no longer be hidden that Germany is the main blocking power of political impulse for enlargement. So far Germany’s excuse was that Americans are ”not fully convinced”. But President Bush’s visit to Kiev was an opportunity to his very clear declarations. Some other supporters of the opening, that is Canada, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia have officially declared their status before the Summmit. I am of an opinion that if the scales would start turning to ”yes”, then Great Britain, who had not been against the enlargement before, would still not mind the idea. France would potentially not mind it either as Sarkozy was sending positive signals, cooled down, however, by the minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner and some other government members. Secondly, if the Germans have their own way and donąt make any concessions, this will have to be treated as a very solemn declaration of how they perceive alliance relations in strategic, political issues. Thirdly, Germans will probably take responsibility for Europe-Russia relations to an level at which it won’t cope with that itself. Fourthly, if the Bucharest Summit doesn’t finish successfully, it will carry disastrous effects for the future of NATO and safety in Europe. Fifthly, there is still a matter of prestige related to the Russian propaganda and diplomacy tone towards NATO. At the occasion of some previous enlargements after 1989, Russia acted in a similar way but with less intensity and with results opposite to its aims. This time, however, the situation can be very different.